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A new round of trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) was 
launched in 2001. One of the major aims of the Doha Development Round is to reduce 
agricultural protection and impose greater discipline on domestic agricultural subsidies, 
particularly those that are the most trade distorting. In this paper we examine whether the 
proposed WTO modalities for agriculture will actually achieve this aim in Norway, 
which ranks among the top providers of government assistance for agriculture. Norway 
has a complex system of farm subsidies buttressed by substantial import protection. The 
extent to which its agricultural support policies will have to be changed in response to 
new WTO disciplines provides an important indication of how successful these are likely 
to be. We find that Norway will probably be able to sustain its current agricultural 
activity and production levels while staying within the new WTO rules. Following recent 
practice in some other WTO members, Norway will be able to reduce its notified support 
without making real changes in some of its programs. However, there will have to be a 
shift from market price support, which is paid for by consumers through higher food 
prices, to budgetary support paid by taxpayers and that could generate internal pressures 
for policy reform. 
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A new round of trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) was 
launched in 2001. One of the major aims of the Doha Development Round is to reduce 
agricultural protection and impose greater discipline on domestic agricultural subsidies, 
particularly those that are most trade distorting. In this paper we examine whether the 
proposed WTO modalities for agriculture will actually achieve this aim in the case of 
Norway. Norwegian agriculture, which accounts for less than one percent of GDP and 
three percent of domestic employment, is among the most heavily protected in the world 
(NILF 2007). The OECD’s Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for Norway was 65 percent 
in 2006, surpassed only by Iceland’s 66 percent (OECD 2007). Norway has a complex 
system of farm subsidies involving deficiency payments, structural income support, 
acreage and headage payments, and a range of indirect supports.  The system is 
buttressed by substantial import protection, which limits market access. Consequently, 
the extent to which Norway will have to change its agricultural support policies in 
response to new WTO disciplines provides an important indicator of how successful 
these are likely to be. 
 
 2. Current and proposed WTO rules for agriculture  
One of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round (UR) of negotiations (1986-1994) 
was an agreement on agriculture. Since the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade in 1947, agriculture had largely been left out of multilateral trade negotiations. 
There had been little reduction in the protection provided through tariff and non-tariff 
trade barriers and support through domestic subsidies (Normile and Simone 2001).   
  The UR Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) made modest progress in this regard, 
resulting in the conversion of non-tariff barriers to bound tariffs with some moderate 
reductions. The AoA introduced limitations on the value of export subsidies and the 
volume of subsidized exports, and a cap on the value of the most trade-distorting 
domestic subsidies, again with a modest reduction in that cap. There were also several 
other innovations, including: a construct called tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) intended to 
provide a minimal level of market access for imports that would otherwise face 
prohibitive tariffs; the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) that defines how trade-
distorting subsidies are to be measured and how the value of support is to be quantified; 
and the classification of two categories of subsidy (blue box and green box) that were to 
be monitored but not subject to reduction commitments.  Blue box support includes 
potentially trade-distorting subsidies that also involve constraints on production, while 
green box support is a category of payments viewed to be minimally distorting for 
production and trade. The quantification of the total AMS includes all product-specific 
and non-product-specific support, except when this is below five percent of the 
corresponding value of production, a threshold defined as de minimis support. The total 
AMS plus the de minimis is referred to as amber box support. 
  3  Agriculture has continued to occupy a central position in the Doha negotiations. 
These focus on the three pillars of the UR AoA: domestic support, market access (tariffs 
and TRQs) and export competition (export subsidies). The AoA is 28 pages long. The 
summary of the draft modalities prepared by the chair of the WTO agricultural 
negotiating committee in December 2008 is over four times as long (123 pages). 
Although commitments in individual country schedules would have to be included in 
considering the respective lengths of the two agreements, the substantial increase in 
length of the body of the draft Doha agreement is indicative of the complexity of the new 
modalities.  
 
Table 1: Summary of agricultural commitments for developed countries                         
 
1. Domestic Support 
(1) 
A. Overall Trade-Distorting Domestic Support (OTDS) 
(2) calculated on the basis of an average for 
1995-2000, to be reduced according to the following: 
    80 percent for base OTDS levels greater than US$60 billion; 
    70 percent for base OTDS levels between US$10 and 60 billion; and 
    55 percent for base OTDS levels less than US$10 billion.  
  B. Total AMS commitment to be reduced according to the following: 
    70 percent for final bound UR AoA levels of greater than US$40 billion; 
    60 percent for levels between US$ 15 and 40 billion; and 
    45 percent for levels less than US$ 15 billion. 
   Furthermore, developed country Members with high relative levels of final bound total 
AMS (i.e., at least 40 percent of the average total value of agricultural production during 
1995-2000) that are in the bottom tier, (i.e., less than US$ 15 billion) are required to make 
an additional reduction of one half of the difference between the reduction rates specified 
for the top two tiers (i.e., ½ [60 – 45] or 7.5 percent). 
C. Product-specific AMS limits 
AMS support on a product-specific basis will have a base rate calculated as the average 
for 1995-2000. In cases where a Member introduced product-specific AMS exceeding the 
de minimis level, but where the country did not have product-specific AMS support 
during the base period, the limit may be the average value for the two years prior to the 
adoption of the modalities. In cases where product-specific support for each year during 
the base period was below the de minimus, the base is the de minimis level. 
D. De minimis 
 The  de minimis levels, either 5 percent of the total value of agricultural production for 
non-product-specific support or 5 percent of the total value of production of a basic 
agricultural product in the case of product-specific support, are to be reduced by no less 
than 50 percent.  
 
 
  4E. Blue box 
The value is capped at 2.5 percent of the average total value of agricultural production for 
1995-2000. Countries with blue box support exceeding 40 percent of the OTDS have a 
reduction commitment equal to that for the AMS. Blue box support for individual 
products is limited to the average value during 1995-2000. 
2. Market Access 
A. Cuts in UR final bound tariffs according to the following: 
50 percent for lines with ad valorem equivalents greater than 0 and less than or equal to 20 
percent; 
57 percent for lines with ad valorem equivalents greater than 20 percent and less than or equal 
to 50 percent; 
64 percent for lines with ad valorem equivalents greater than 50 percent and less than or equal 
to 75 percent; and 
70 percent for lines with ad valorem equivalents greater than 75 percent. 
There is also a requirement that the minimum average cut across all final bound tariffs is 54 
percent and a tariff ceiling of 100 percent.  
B. Sensitive products 
Of the 1,354 agricultural tariff lines, 4 percent can be designated as sensitive. An additional 2 
percent can be designated sensitive by Members that have more than 30 percent of their tariff 
lines in the top band. There is a requirement for TRQ expansion for sensitive products, 
depending on the deviation from the applicable tiered reduction formula in the final bound 
tariff rates on products designated as sensitive.  If tariffs on sensitive products exceed 100 
percent ad valorem after the reduction, a higher quota expansion of 0.5 percent of domestic 
consumption is required on those lines.  
C. Other issues: TRQs 
In-quota tariffs are to be reduced either by 50 percent or to a threshold of 10 percent, 
whichever is lower. In cases where the TRQ was administered by the MFN bound rate, the 
Member can eliminate the tariff quota. There is to be stricter administration of TRQ fill rates. 
Members have the right to request that unused import licenses be reallocated to potential users 
in cases where the quota is not filled.   
3. Export subsidies are to be eliminated. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
(1) Special provisions apply to the calculation of product-specific blue box limits for the United States and 
there are some provisions for shifting product-specific support from the AMS to the blue box (see 
Blandford et al. 2008). These are not included in the table. 
(2) There is an additional reduction for developed countries with an OTDS exceeding 40% of the value of 
production. 
Sources: WTO (2008b), for domestic support, see also Orden (2008)  
 
Table 1 summarizes the main features of the Doha-round proposals. The proposed cuts in 
domestic support are substantial. The biggest users of domestic support (defined in terms 
of the value of the bound AMS in US dollars) have the largest reduction commitment. 
Norway's total bound AMS is less than US$ 2 billion, placing it in the lowest tier of cuts 
in domestic support. However, the notified total AMS as a share of the value of 
agricultural production amounted to roughly 58 percent during 1995-2000, requiring a 
  5further cut of 7.5 percent. A cap on blue box subsidies is also proposed. There is also a 
new support concept, the overall trade-distorting support (OTDS), defined as the sum of 
the total AMS, blue box, and product-specific and non-product specific de minimis 
support. The OTDS is capped and has a reduction commitment. The OTDS is intended to 
act as a constraint on policymakers' overall ability to support agriculture. 
  The main principles for the market access proposals are also summarized in Table 
1. Under the draft modalities countries would be required to reduce their highest MFN 
bound tariffs (those exceeding 75 percent ad valorem) by 70 percent and reduce overall 
MFN rates by 54 percent. However, under the conditions for designating sensitive 
products, Norway would have the right to declare 81 product lines as sensitive. These 
would be subject to smaller tariff reductions, but would require a corresponding increase 
in any associated market access quota under a TRQ. Finally, the Doha draft modalities 
call for the phased elimination of export subsidies. 
  On the surface, the proposed changes seem dramatic for Norway. As we shall 
demonstrate, both the actual AMS and blue box support are currently high. In addition, 
border protection is extremely high (WTO 2001). The applied average tariff on all 
agricultural products under Chapter 2 of the harmonized system was 38 percent in 2004 
(WTO 2004). However, 44 percent of the bound most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs are in 
the range of 100-400 percent.
1 In addition, Norway has the highest number of TRQs 
negotiated of any WTO member country, 232 out of a WTO total of 1,425. In-quota tariff 
rates also generally exceed 100 percent. 
                                                 
1 See Appendix 3 for details. 
  6  Norway has WTO commitments on export subsidies for a range of agricultural 
products, primarily under the meat and dairy product lines, with the most important being 
the commitment on cheese. This is because of the absolute volume of subsidized exports 
involved and the near 100 percent fill rate for the allowable export quota during 1995-
2004. In its most recent export subsidy notification to the WTO (2008a) covering 2005-
2007, Norway indicated that it continued to use more than 90 percent of its volume 
commitment on subsidized cheese exports of 16,208 tons, and 80 percent, on average, of 
the commitment on the maximum value of export subsidies of 246 million Norwegian 
krone (NOK)
2.    
                                                 
2 Norway’s notifications to the WTO are reported in Norwegian krone (NOK). For readers who are 
unfamiliar with the value of the Norwegian currency, the approximate exchange rate against USD in 
February 2009 was 7.00. However, a more representative value of the USD in terms of NOK would be to 
take the average value over the last 25 years, which is approximately 7.50.   
  73. The WTO Modalities and Domestic Support in Norway 
3.1  How Norway has adapted to the Uruguay Round 
As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, Norway established a base (1986-1988 
average) for its total AMS of NOK 14.3 billion. This was reduced by 20 percent to NOK 
11.4 billion over the implementation period, 1995-2000.  
Norway's AMS is composed primarily of market price support, which is measured 
as the difference between domestic administrative prices and a fixed reference price, 
multiplied by eligible production. A binding reduction in the AMS would therefore 
translate into a reduction in administrative prices or eligible production or both. 
Figure 1 (a) highlights developments in Norway’s total AMS. The bound rate is 
the kinked line that declines from 1995-2000 with the annual reduction commitment 
under the Uruguay Round and then levels off at the new total AMS ceiling after 2000. 
The current annual AMS, represented by the lower line, is below the bound rate for the 
entire period but the gap has narrowed, particularly after 2000, suggesting that the bound 
rate has the potential to become binding. Current AMS data are presented through 2004 
because that is the last year for which Norway has notified its domestic support to the 
WTO. In panel (b), the composition of the total support in terms of the various boxes is 
shown. Total support is the aggregate of green, blue and amber box measures for 
agriculture. Only the amber and blue box components would be subject to reduction 
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Figure 1: Domestic agricultural support in Norway. 1995-2004 
































































Panel (a): AMS          Panel (b): Total domestic support 
 
 
Green box support 
Support that has no or minimal production and trade-distorting effects can, according to 
Annex 2 of the AoA, be placed in the green box category. This type of support must be 
provided through a publicly-funded government program not involving transfers from 
consumers, and cannot have the effect of providing price support to producers (Blandford 
and Josling 2007). There are no ceilings or reduction commitments on the value of 
support under the green box. The largest item notified by Norway under the category is 
the “vacation and replacement scheme”, which provides refunds for farm-related 
expenses when a farmer takes a vacation. This form of support is not explicitly mentioned 
in Annex 2, but it is quite substantial, accounting for roughly one third of Norway’s green 
  9box total. Since, in reality, the scheme can have an effect equivalent to a farm labor 
subsidy, it could be argued that it stimulates production. In addition, payments made 
under the scheme are based either on the number of animals or the acreage in production, 
which appears to be inconsistent with the production-neutral requirement of green box 
support. Member countries could challenge Norway’s inclusion of this program in the 
green box, requiring that it be notified under the AMS instead. 
  Another potentially controversial green box measure is the grain price-support 
program, which according to the government includes two items. The main item is a 
payment for stockholding for food security purposes, which is notified to the WTO under 
the “public stockholding for food security purposes” heading. The payment is given to 
processing industries that use Norwegian grain. It is paid on a per kilogram basis, and, in 
effect, reduces the price to domestic grain users. According to the WTO, an important 
criterion for payments under the “public stockholding for food security purposes” is: 
“Expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to the accumulation and 
holding of stocks of products which form an integral part of a food 
security programme identified in national legislation. This may include 
government aid to private storage of products as part of such a programme. 
. . Food purchases by the government shall be made at current market 
prices and sales from food security stocks shall be made at no less than the 
current domestic market price for the product and quality in question” 
(GATT 1994, p. 58).  
 
  10The current Norwegian system does not satisfy this condition and its inclusion in the 
green box is also potentially subject to challenge. 
 
Blue box support 
Schemes classified under the blue box fall under three types: (1) payments based on fixed 
area and yields; (2) payments made on 85 percent or less of the base level of production; 
and (3) livestock payments made on a fixed number of head. As with green box programs 
there was no WTO commitment on the total value of blue box support in the AoA.  
  From Figure 1 (b) it may be seen that the share of the blue box support in total 
Norwegian support is large, amounting to some 25 percent. Together with the amber box 
(AMS), these two categories constitute roughly two-thirds of overall domestic support. 
Norway’s most prominent blue box measure has been the “acreage and cultural landscape 
scheme”, a fixed area support payment.  But “headage support”, a per unit livestock 
payment, is almost as high.
3  
 
3.2 The Doha round proposals for domestic support 
Table 2 summarizes the proposed commitments for the reduction in Norwegian domestic 
support, based on the most current draft report on modalities for agriculture prepared by 
the chair of the WTO agriculture committee, Crawford Falconer (WTO 2008b), 
corresponding to the formula presented in Table 1. The OTDS value, NOK 21.2 billion, 
is the sum of the current AMS ceiling, the average blue box value during 1995-2000, and 
                                                 
3 Smaller measures are “regional deficiency payments” for milk and meat production. These are categorized 
as payments based on 85 percent or less of base level production. 
  11the de minimis support, which is five percent of the value of agricultural production. 
Since Norway has a total AMS less than US$ 15 billion, its AMS reduction commitment 
is 45 percent. However, countries such as Norway that have a high AMS as a share of 
total value of production face an additional 7.5 percent reduction. This 52.5 percent 
requirement means that Norway's total AMS binding has to be reduced from NOK 11.4 
billion to NOK 5.4 billion. In addition, Norway currently has more than 40 percent of its 
trade distorting support under blue box measures, which requires the same reduction 
commitment as the total AMS. This would reduce the maximum value of blue box 
support from NOK 7.5 billion to NOK 3.6 billion. Norway would be required to reduce 
its OTDS by 55 percent, because the OTDS base is less than US$10 billion, resulting in a 
commitment of NOK 9.5 billion.
4   
 
Table 2: Current rates of support and proposed commitments (billion NOK) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on current draft modalities, WTO (2008b) and MAF (2009, p. 9) 




AMS 11.4 5.4 
Blue box  7.5 3.6 
De minimis support  2.3 1.1 
Overall trade distorting support (OTDS)  21.2 9.5 
  
  Norway’s current AMS is around NOK 10 billion. Blue box support has varied 
between NOK 7 and 8 billion in recent years, yielding an OTDS of roughly NOK 18 
                                                 
4 It is likely that the NOK 9.5 billion in OTDS under the proposed Doha commitment would act as the 
binding constraint on domestic support. The sum of the new AMS and blue box ceiling would be NOK 9.0 
billion, which is below the OTDS ceiling, and Norway could use the remaining NOK 0.5 billion as non-
product-specific de minimis support.  Norway began using around NOK 0.1 billion in de minimis support 
after 2002 (WTO 2008c).  
  12billion. Hence, if the proposed Doha Round commitments are agreed, the Norwegian 
agricultural sector seems to face substantial change since the OTDS would be capped at 
NOK 9.5 billion. However, there are reasons to believe that the impact of the Doha 
Round commitments would not be so dramatic. These are discussed in the following sub-
sections. 
 
3.3 Box  shifting 
If a country is likely to have problems meeting WTO commitments on trade-distorting 
support, it may try to redefine its policy measures so that these can be notified as green 
box. Norway has undertaken considerable preparation to justify such box shifting. The 
“acreage and cultural landscape scheme” is an example. In 2005 this scheme was 
included as an important element in the National Environmental Programme (MLSI 
2004, MLSI 2005 and MAF 2005). For a farmer to be eligible for support an 
environmental plan must be followed and land must be managed in an environmentally 
friendly manner. The farmer receives a per hectare payment for compliance. There is 
additional support to help cover the cost of implementing certain types of production 
techniques, provided on an activity-specific basis. The national regulatory body, the 
Norwegian Agricultural Authority, has claimed that this support complies with green box 
criteria.
5   
In 2007, another change was introduced by the Norwegian Agricultural Authority 
whereby the support to grazing livestock, which earlier was considered part of “headage 
                                                 
5 This can be questioned because the green box compliance criteria state that such payments can only 
compensate for additional costs or income foregone through complying with an environmental program.  
  13support” under the blue box, was included in the National Environmental Programme and 
was claimed to be green box (MAF 2006).  Because the support was labeled as a 
component of an environmental program, it was re-classified even though the nature of 
the payment had not changed. Hence, NOK 3 billion of the NOK 7.5 billion blue box 
support has already been shifted into the green box, which should make it easier for 
Norwegian policymakers to meet a Doha cap of NOK 3.6 billion under the blue box. 
 
3.4 Following the Japanese example 
In 1997, Japan reduced its notified AMS substantially by changing its rice policy. 
Administered prices for rice were eliminated, although the government continued to 
acquire rice for food security stocks (Godo and Takahashi 2008). There was little real 
change in the Japanese rice market since domestic producers were protected by a TRQ 
with a prohibitive over-quota tariff. Many other WTO countries have since lowered their 
AMS support by abolishing or redefining the purpose of administered prices thereby 
removing market price support from the AMS calculation (Orden 2008).
6 
When Norway notified its support for 2002-2004, it changed the definition of 
some administered prices.
7 This redefinition had the effect of lowering the market price 
                                                 
6 According to Brink (2008), other countries, notably Australia, EU, Mexico, South Africa, Switzerland and 
the USA have also adopted this strategy. 
7 In the 2002-2004 domestic support notification (WTO 2008c), the administered milk price was measured 
at the farm gate level, while in earlier notifications it was measured at the dairy processing level.  This 
counts for 1/3 of the discrepancy between the old and new way of notifying. In addition, changes were 
made in the formulae used for calculating the value of compensation for concentrated feed. This accounts 
for another 1/3 of the discrepancy.  
  14support component in the total AMS. Without this redefinition, it is likely that Norway 
would have broken the AMS-ceiling (Mjørlund and Vårdal 2008).  
The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and Food has on several occasions 
announced that it will abolish certain domestic administered prices, as a means of 
reducing its current total AMS. From 1 January 2007, an equivalent reference price for 
poultry meat replaced the former administered price. In a proposition to the parliament 
(MAF 2005), it was argued that this would remove market price support for poultry meat 
from the AMS calculation and reduce total AMS support by NOK 800 million. In May 
2008, in negotiations between the farmers’ unions and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food, it was agreed to increase prices on most agricultural products, an action that would 
likely have violated the AMS ceiling. The problem was solved by replacing administered 
prices by reference prices for sows, boars and mutton, thereby removing these products 











  154. An Assessment of the Implications of the Doha Modalities for Norway 
The reduction commitments under any of the three pillars in the Doha modalities could 
potentially affect Norwegian agricultural policies. For example, consider the effect of 
eliminating export subsidies for cheese. The inability to provide such subsidies would 
curtail cheese exports, which are a convenient avenue for removing surplus milk from the 
domestic market. Hence, the elimination of export subsidies seems to imply a cut in the 
price of milk in order to reduce production. This would reduce the market price support 
component in the AMS. Lower milk production could also reduce income support under 
blue box support programs.  
Similarly, reductions in tariffs and increases in the market access quotas under 
TRQs across various product lines should lead to lower domestic prices through 
increased competition from imports. Therefore, increased market access should result in 
reductions in measured domestic support. A key issue is the extent to which the export 
competition and market access modalities would actually reduce measured support and, 
by extension, how much additional effort Norway might have to make to meet the Doha 
domestic support bindings summarized in Table 2. 
 
4.1 The model  
To examine these issues we use a price-endogenous model of Norwegian agriculture. The 
model includes the most important commodities produced by the Norwegian agricultural 
sector. For given input costs, demand functions and support systems, the model computes 
market clearing prices and quantities. The model includes all major agricultural policies and 
generates estimates of production, use of inputs, domestic consumption and prices, imports 
  16and exports, measures of notified support, and economic surplus measured as the sum of 
producers’ and consumers’ surplus.
8 Further details are provided in Appendix 1. 
  The base year in the model is 2003. Since the structure and size of agricultural 
production, as well as agricultural support, has been relatively stable over the last decade, 
this can be viewed as a representative year. The current AMS in the base year 2003 
amounted to 93 percent of the ceiling set in the UR AoA. 
 
4.2 Doha assumptions and implementation 
The main features of the proposed modalities under the most recent draft agreement are 
summarized in Table 1. To consider the implications for Norway, the relevant modalities 
are considered and the assumptions used are given in Table 3. The final bound AMS as 
well as the average blue box support in the base period 1995-2000 has to be reduced by 
52.5 percent, while the maximum OTDS is to be reduced by 55 percent. Compared to the 
levels in the base year, which differ from the base rates, AMS, blue box support and 
OTDS have to be reduced by 49, 51.4 and 48.6 percent, respectively.    
With respect to market access, MFN tariffs for products in the top tier that are not 
defined as sensitive are subject to a 70 percent reduction, with a 100 percent ceiling. For 
the principle Norwegian products, the 100 percent ceiling will be binding. However, as is 
pointed out below, since all principle Norwegian products can be defined as sensitive, the 
100 percent ceiling will not be relevant.  
                                                 
8 More details and further references can be found in Brunstad et al. (2005). The model is constructed to 
perform policy analysis and has been used by the Norwegian Ministries of Finance, and Agriculture and 
Food. 
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Table 3. Main assumptions in the model 
1. Domestic Support  
A. OTDS: the base rate value of OTDS is reduced 55 percent.  
B. AMS: the UR bound rate is reduced by 52.5 percent (45 + 7.5 percent).  
C. Product-specific AMS: the de minimis level based on the average value of production of the 
basic agricultural product.   
D. De minimis: product-specific and non-product-specific de minimis are reduced by 50 percent. 
E. Blue box: reduced by 52.5 percent from the 1995-2000 base. 
2. Market Access 
A. MFN bound tariff rates: average 70 percent reduction for the highest tariff lines and there is a 
100 percent tariff ceiling for all non-sensitive goods. 
B. Sensitive products: the maximum number of tariff lines that qualify as sensitive products under 
agriculture is 6 percent (4 plus an extra 2 percent in cases where a Member has more than 30 
percent of their tariff lines in the top tariff band) based on the total number of HS-6 tariffs lines 
under agriculture (WTO definition of agriculture). 
C. MFN tariffs for sensitive products: MFN bound rates reduced by 23.33 percent (a 2/3 deviation 
from the otherwise 70 percent reduction).  
D. TRQ expansion: the market access quota is 6.5 – 7 percent of domestic consumption (6 plus an 
extra 0.5 percent because all sensitive products have tariff rates exceeding 100 percent. For the 
additional 2 percent of sensitive products from B, TRQs are expanded by an extra 0.5 percent. 
This means that the TRQs are 6.5 percent of domestic consumption for the first 4 percent of the 
sensitive products, and 7 percent for the next 2 percent.)   
E. TRQ fill rate: a minimum fill rate of 65 percent to avoid being challenged by other WTO 
members.     
3. Export subsidies are eliminated. 
_______________________________________________________________________   
Sources: WTO (2008b); Gaasland, Garcia and Vårdal (2008) 
 
 
  Products defined as sensitive are subject to lower tariff reductions, but at the 
expense of creating new market access opportunities through TRQs, which are additional 
to the existing TRQs from the UR.  We assume that Norway will choose to define 6 
percent of the total number of products listed under the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System of the tariff nomenclature (HS) at the 6-digit level (HS-6) 
as sensitive. This means that all principle Norwegian products such as grain, meat and 
milk products, are covered as sensitive products (see Appendix 4).  
  18  The ordinary tariffs for sensitive products are subject to a 23.33 percent reduction 
in the MFN tariff rate (i.e. 2/3 deviation from the otherwise 70 percent reduction), which 
yields tariffs above 100 percent. Concessions in the form of new TRQs amount to 6.5 
percent of domestic consumption, but with an additional 0.5 percent for the additional 2 
percent of the product lines declared as sensitive products. The quota fill rate is set to 65 
percent, below which challenges can be made by other WTO members.  We assume that 
the authorities only hand out import quotas equal to this minimum fill rate. This will help 
promote price and market stability, which has been a hallmark of Norwegian agricultural 
policy. Finally, export subsidies are abolished. The details behind these calculations are 




The first column in Table 4 shows that domestic support in the base year 2003 was far 
above the new ceilings generated by the reduction commitments in Table 3. The current 
AMS exceeds the new ceilings by 96 percent, blue support by 109 percent, and the OTDS 
by 90 percent. The first strategy to minimize the impact on agricultural activity, which 
Norway already has followed, is to transfer subsidies from blue to green categories. In 
2005, two years after the base year of our analysis, roughly NOK 3 billion previously 
included in the “acreage and cultural landscape scheme” under the blue box was shifted 
to the green box without any major change in how the policy was implemented. The 
second column in Table 4 reflects this move. While production value and economic 
  19welfare are unchanged, blue box support and the OTDS decrease substantially, with blue 
box support now only 26 percent above the ceiling.         
  The next question is whether compliance with market access reduction 
commitments and the elimination of the export subsidy, as reported in Table 3, will be 
sufficient to bring support levels below the ceilings. The effects of eliminating export 
subsidies are shown in column 3 of Table 4. The present practice of subsidizing exports 
of cheese by levies on domestic sales of liquid milk is abolished. The implication is lower 
milk production which is accomplished by a cut in the farm gate price of milk. Since that 
price, interpreted as an administered price, enters into the market price support 
component of the total AMS, it and the OTDS are reduced (12 percent and 9 percent, 
respectively). Lower milk production and farm gate prices lead to a 6 percent decline in 
the total value of agricultural production. However, the 5 percent increase in economic 
welfare is indicative of the economic cost of the current policy regime.         
If we now implement the market access commitments specified in Table 3, we 
generate the results in the fourth column of Table 4. While blue box support is close to 
the ceiling, the total AMS and the OTDS still exceed commitments by 23-39 percent. In 
other words, even if Norway complies with the market access and export subsidy 
commitments, the total AMS and the OTDS will still be too high. Also, observe that the 
production value in agriculture is now 25 percent below the present level which suggests 
that further cut in AMS and OTDS to comply with the commitments would have a major 
impact on Norwegian agriculture.  























(Commitment = 100)         
AMS 196  196  172  139 73 
Blue box  209  126  126  109 88 
OTDS 190  163  148  123 74 
         
(Base solution = 100)         
Production value   100  100    94  75 92 
Economic welfare  100  100  105  127 109 
To minimize the effects, an obvious strategy would be to abolish the administered 
prices, which, as explained in section 3.4, will remove market price support as defined by 
the UR AoA from the AMS calculation.
9 Since 98 percent of Norway's AMS is market 
price support, this provides substantial flexibility to compensate with deficiency 
payments within the NOK 5.4 billion AMS ceiling specified in Table 2. The results in 
column 5 show that it is possible to maintain more than 90 percent of the production 
value while meeting WTO commitments with safe margins.  
We can conclude that even through the proposed Doha commitments seem to 
allow Norway to maintain most of its current agricultural activity level, the framing of 
agricultural policy will have to change. The present system of domestic market regulation 
                                                 
9 The de minimis quantities in the OTDS would allow Norway a limited amount of additional flexibility if it 
were to adjust its support levels. For example, Norway could use non-product-specific support amounting 
to 1.1 billion NOK providing that total trade-distorting support does not exceed the limit on the OTDS. 
However, given the amount by which the AMS and the blue box exceed their respective bindings in column 
4 of Table 4, the support provided under those categories would have to be reduced substantially before this 
would become a viable option. 
  21will be put under pressure when administered prices and export subsidies are eliminated 
and import options increase. Furthermore, cuts in import tariffs and higher TRQs imply 
lower farm gate prices, and, consequently, lower market price support. It follows that 
relatively more of the support has to be provided by taxpayers. Table 5 shows that 
budgetary support increases, in absolute terms, by nearly NOK 3 billion, while market 
price support is more than halved. As a result total support is only NOK 2 billion below 
the base year level. 
 






Budget support   10.7  13.9 
Market price support (actual)    9.8    4.5 
Total support   20.5  18.4 
  226. Conclusions 
A major achievement of the Uruguay Round was to include agriculture in the WTO 
system of multilateral trade rules. However, the agreement has had only a modest effect 
on Norway's agricultural production and trade. The agreed constraint on amber box 
support has not affected Norwegian agricultural programs. Norway has, in fact, managed 
to expand agricultural output relative to the 1986-1988 base period, and the current total 
AMS and total support have remained stable during 1995-2004. The most that can be 
concluded is that there has been some reduction in the “water” in the inflated binding on 
the total AMS.  
  The question raised in this paper is whether a positive outcome in the on-going 
Doha Round will require real policy change. At first sight, the Doha draft modalities 
appear to be a considerable advance on the weak disciplines in the UR AoA. Norway’s 
current AMS, blue box and OTDS exceed the proposed Doha ceilings by 90 – 110 
percent, and either elimination of export subsidies or the required increase in market 
access are sufficient to bring support levels below the ceilings.  
  However, it is likely that Norway, like many other countries, will try to reduce the 
current AMS and blue box support in ways that involve no major change in policy. First, 
Norway has already shifted roughly NOK 3 billion from blue box to green box with only 
modest changes in the requirements for receiving such support. Second, the market price 
component of AMS is being reduced for some products by simply changing the way 
administered prices are calculated or replacing these with reference prices, which are not 
covered in the AoA. This provides substantial flexibility to compensate producers 
through deficiency payments within the AMS ceiling.             
  23By using such approaches our empirical analysis suggests that Norway will be 
able to maintain most of the current activity in agriculture. However, the framing of 
agricultural policy will have to change. The present system of domestic market regulation 
will be put under pressure when export subsidies are eliminated and market access 
improves. Most important, cuts in import tariffs and expanded TRQ volumes imply lower 
farm gate prices, and, consequently, lower market price support. Relatively more of the 
support will have to be provided by taxpayers, and to sustain current agricultural activity 
budgetary support will have to increase substantially compared to the current level. Such 
a shift in the use of policy instruments involves serious challenges for Norwegian 
policymakers since budget support is more transparent than market price support and 
hence exposed to public scrutiny. Norway’s policies may also be more exposed 
internationally if WTO-member countries begin to look more closely at Norwegian 
notifications and question whether its “green-box” support programs actually meet WTO 
rules. For example, the AMS-limit will be exceeded if Norway is forced to notify the 
“acreage and cultural landscape scheme” and “headage support” as AMS-support.  
In conclusion, on the basis of our analysis it is difficult to envisage that any 
fundamental reform in Norwegian agricultural policy will result from the implementation 
of the Doha Round modalities as currently drafted. Unless Norway decides to implement 
reform unilaterally, pressure for any real policy change through WTO disciplines will to 
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  29Appendix 1: Short description of the agricultural model for Norway
10 
Domestic supply is represented by about 400 “model farm” types. Each model farm is 
characterized by Leontief technology, having fixed input and output coefficients. 
Although inputs cannot substitute for each other at the farm level, there are substitution 
possibilities at the sector level. For example, beef can be produced with different 
technologies (under different model farm types), under either extensive or intensive 
production systems, and in combination with milk. Thus, in line with the general Leontief 
model in which each good may have more than one activity that can produce it, the 
isoquant for each product is piecewise linear. Also, production can take place on either 
small farms or larger more productive farms. Consequently, there is an element of 
economies of scale in the model.  
The country is divided into nine regions, each with limited supply of different 
grades of land. This introduces an element of diseconomies of scale because, ceteris 
paribus, production will first take place in the best regions. Domestic demand for final 
products is represented by linear demand functions. The economic surplus (i.e., consumer 
plus producer surplus) of the agricultural sector is maximized, subject to demand and 
supply relationships, policy instruments and imposed restrictions. The solution to the 


















                                                 
10 More details and further references can be found in Mittenzwei and Gaasland (2008). 












Production (mill kg)        
Milk 1517  1383  1333  1400 
Beef and veal  81  82  63  84 
Sheep 23  23  24  23 
Pig meat  110  111  78  110 
Poultry 50  51  48  53 
Eggs 53  53  50  53 
Food grains  346  336  164  226 
Coarse grains  893  883  708  890 
Potatoes 289  290  290  289 
Production value (billion NOK)  27.9 26.2  21.0  25.6 
Land (mill haa)  0.92  0.91  0.74  0.88 
Labor (1000 man-years)  53.5  52.4  45.1  52.1 
Support (billion NOK)  20.5 19.0  15.6  18.4 
Budget support  10.7  10.8  9.3  13.9 
    Amber  0.3  0.3  0.3  5.0 
    Blue  7.8  4.7  4.0  3.3 
    Green  2.6  5.7  4.9  5.6 
Market price support  9.8  8.3  6.3  4.5 
%PSE  0.73 0.73  0.75  0.72 
WTO         
Blue 7.8  4.7  4.0  3.3 
AMS 13.4  11.8  9.6  5.0 
    Subsidies  0.3  0.3  0.3  5.0 
    Market price support (ref.prices)  13.1  11.4  9.2  0.0 
OTDS 21.2  16.5  13.6  8.3 









  31Appendix 3: Degree of protection – base solution 














Rye  3.09 0.73 2.36 323 %  347 % 7 %
Minced meat  69.37 17.00 52.37 308 %  344 % 10 %
Rapeseed  7.78 2.17 5.61 259 %  268 % 4 %
Beef: steak, filet.   98.42 27.00 71.42 265 %  343 % 23 %
Peas  4.95 1.54 3.41 221 %  214 % -3 %
Other meat  69.10 20.00 49.10 246 %  344 % 29 %
Wheat  3.09 0.95 2.14 225 %  347 % 35 %
Other grain   3.09 0.95 2.14 225 %  347 % 35 %
Cooked meats  131.08 40.00 91.08 228 %  363 % 37 %
Poultry  30.66 9.00 21.66 241 %  425 % 43 %
Pig meat: steak, filet   77.96 25.00 52.96 212 %  363 % 42 %
Sausages  53.88 18.00 35.88 199 %  344 % 42 %
Production of meat  45.13 15.00 30.13 201 %  363 % 45 %
Oats  2.05 0.80 1.25 156 %  233 % 33 %
Smoked sausage  142.53 51.00 91.53 179 %  344 % 48 %
Barley   2.05 0.76 1.29 170 %  318 % 47 %
Sheep meat: steak, filet   130.23 45.00 85.23 189 %  429 % 56 %
Flour  6.14 2.25 3.89 173 %  371 % 53 %
Apples  16.55 7.89 8.66 110 %  171 % 36 %
Flowers  5.73 2.50 3.23 129 %  249 % 48 %
Beef: carcass   32.36 13.00 19.36 149 %  344 % 57 %
Cheese, semi-soft (industrial use)  39.40 18.00 21.40 119 %  277 % 57 %
Butter  30.37 13.00 17.37 134 %  343 % 61 %
Pig meat: carcasses  26.72 12.00 14.72 123 %  363 % 66 %
Vegetables,  greenhouse  12.86 8.27 4.59 56 %  134 % 59 %
Fluid milk, sweet   14.29 8.00 6.29 79 %  223 % 65 %
Vegetables,  outdoors  7.22 4.82 2.40 50 %  126 % 60 %
Concentrated feed  3.14 1.50 1.64 109 %  347 % 68 %
Cheese, semi-soft (consumption)  56.87 30.00 26.87 90 %  277 % 68 %
Cured ham  135.06 65.00 70.06 108 %  363 % 70 %
Fluid milk (domestic consumption)  7.68 3.60 4.08 113 %  388 % 71 %
Cream  31.68 14.00 17.68 126 %  439 % 71 %
Pig meat: cuts, fresh  35.70 18.00 17.70 98 %  363 % 73 %
Potatoes  3.80 2.56 1.24 48 %  191 % 75 %
Beef: salted, smoked, marinated   83.17 45.00 38.17 85 %  344 % 75 %
Cheese, goat  50.97 34.00 16.97 50 %  233 % 79 %
Yoghurt  20.13 12.00 8.13 68 %  319 % 79 %
Beef: cuts, fresh   38.33 22.00 16.33 74 %  344 % 78 %
Cheese, whey  48.36 34.00 14.36 42 %  233 % 82 %
Eggs  14.84 10.00 4.84 48 %  272 % 82 %
Sheep meat: cuts, fresh   55.80 31.00 24.80 80 %  429 % 81 %
Fluid milk (domestic industry)  3.27 2.00 1.27 64 %  388 % 84 %
Sheep meat: salted, smoked, marinated  78.08 45.97 32.11 70 %  429 % 84 %
Other fruit  16.82 24.89 -8.07 -32 %  83 % 139 %
Cheese, soft  47.27 45.00 2.27 5 %  233 % 98 %
Sheep meat: carcasses  28.92 20.00 8.92 45 %  429 % 90 %
Pig meat: salted, smoked, marinated   41.91 35.55 6.36 18 %  363 % 95 %
Milk powder  16.79 14.00 2.79 20 %  392 % 95 %
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Appendix  4:  Tariff rate quotas and tariffs for Norway resulting from the proposed Doha commitments – data  
Product classification in 


























Wheat  10.01.10, 10.01.90  2  1    252  347 %  318  112  430  267.36  266 % 
Rye  10.02.00  1  1    37  347 %  22    22  37.77  266 % 
Barley   10.03.00  1  1    59  318 %  610  150  760  91.09  244 % 
Oats  10.04.00  1  1    1  233 %  278    278  12.75  179 % 





 11.03.19, 11.03.20  8    1    371 %  336    336  15.27  284 % 
Concentrated feed  23.09.90  1    1    347 %  1593    1593  72.50  266 % 
Rapeseed    1  1    8  268 %  10  0  10  8.44  205 % 
Peas    1  1      214 %  1  1  2  0.09  164 % 
Potatoes    1  1    0.499  191 %  289    289  12.70  146 % 
Fluid milk  
(domestic consumption)  1   0.013  388 %  41    41  1.74  297 % 
Fluid milk  
(domestic industry)  1     388 %  11    11  0.44  297 % 
Fluid milk, sweet   1      223 %  4    4  0.15  171 % 
Yoghurt 
04.01.10, 04.01.20, 
04.01.30,   
04.03.10, 04.03.90 
5 
1     319 %  40    40  1.69  245 % 
Cheese, semi-soft 
(consumption)   1   277 %  41  3  43  1.97  212 % 
Cheese, semi-soft 
(industrial use)   1   277 %  11    11  0.48  212 % 
Cheese, soft    1    233 %  4    4  0.16  179 % 










04.02.91, 04.02.99  5    1  0.241  392 %  24    24  1.31  301 % 
Cream  (incl. fluid milk)      1    439 %  44    44  2.02  337 % 
Butter  04.05.10, 04.05.20, 
04.05.90  3  1    0.575  343 %  15  2  16  1.26  263 % 
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Product classification in 


























Beef: carcasses  1    1.084  344 %  81  1  82  4.56  264 % 
Beef: cuts, fresh  1    0.034  344 %  3  1  3  0.17  264 % 
Beef: fresh, steak, filet  1      343 %  12    12  0.51  263 % 








1      344 %  0    0  0.02  264 % 
Pig meat: carcasses  1    1.381  363 %  109    109  6.00  278 % 
Pig meat: cuts, fresh   1      363 %  43    43  1.82  278 % 
Pig meat: steak, filet   1    0.983  363 %  3    3  1.12  278 % 









1      363 %  0    0  0.01  278 % 
Sheep meat: carcasses  1    0.206  429 %  23    23  1.17  329 % 
Sheep meat: cuts, fresh  1      429 %  9    9  0.40  329 % 
Sheep meat: steak, filet  1      429 %  0    0  0.00  329 % 






 02.04.42, 02.04.43 
8 




02.07.14, 16.02.32  5  1    0.366  425 %  47  3  50  2.49  326 % 
Other meat, processed  (incl. beef, pig or 
sheep, 16.02.90)   1  1      344 %  24    24  0.99  264 % 
Production meat  (incl. Beef, Pig or 
Sheep)     1      363 %  112    112  4.74  278 % 
Minced meat  (incl. beef, pig or 
sheep)     1      344 %  33    33  1.38  264 % 
Sausages  16.01.00  1  1    0.134  344 %  57    57  2.53  264 % 
Cooked meats  (incl. beef, pig or 
sheep)     1      363 %  23    23  0.96  278 % 
Smoked sausage  (incl. 16.01.00)    1      344 %  3    3  0.14  264 % 
Cured ham  16.02.41, 16.02.42  2  1      363 %  4    4  0.18  278 % 
Eggs  04.07.00  1  1     1.295  272 %  53     53  3.54  209 % 
Sum 
  
no. of  sensitive lines 





















*) 4% of WTO tariff lines; 6.5 percent increase in TRQ  **) 2% of WTO tariff lines; 7 percent increase in TRQ 
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